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"THE WINTER OF MY DESOLATION"
CONSCIENCE AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ATHEISM
ACCORDING TO JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

Michael J. BUCKLEY,
S.J.

Among the historic advances bringing into realization both the
promise and the menace of the nineteenth century, Friedrich
Nietzsche and John Henry Newman identified a momentous reversal in religious convictions. 1 Something absolutely fundamental was
dying. Both discerned an irretrievable decline in the religious confidence and doctrinal commitments that had for fifteen hundred
years specified the character of Christian Europe and whose dissolution constituted now for the individual believer and for the
religious culture of the West a defiant, even insurmountable crisis.
Both recognized that this disintegration bespoke not another episodic appearance of chronic religious alienation nor the momentary
revivification of an ancient disbelief. A profound cultural reversal,
unique in Christian history, was claiming the nations of Europe.
It was a revolution, gathering continual increase in its distinguished
adherents as an educated skepticism about creed and denominational allegiances almost imperceptibly matured into an open and
outspoken dismissal of any reality of God. 2 Nietzsche and Newman

1 "From the time that I began to occupy my mind with theological subjects I
have been troubled at the prospect, which I considered to lie before us, of an
intellectual movement against religion, so special as to have a claim upon the
attention of all educated Christians." John Henry Newman, "On Final Causes,"
as in The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty, ed.
J. Derek Holmes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) 156.
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foresaw that this denial was to break upon the subsequent century
and eventually tell upon all the portions of what had once been
Christendom.
For Nietzsche, this was the greatest event in human history, the
death of God - the coming to acceptance that "the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable. " 3 For Newman, this dark foreshadowing of an even darker future formed "the winter of my desolation,"
as the world moved with increasing momentum toward the repudiation
of what he held most tenaciously within it: "And in these latter days,
in like manner, outside the Catholic Church things are tending, - with
far greater rapidity than in that old time from the circumstance of the
age, - to atheism in one shape or another. What a scene, what a prospect, does the whole of Europe present at this day! and not only
Europe, but every government and every civilization through the
world, which is under the influence of the European mind! " 4 It was,
he judged, an unprecedented disruption: "that the writers and thinkers
of the day do not even believe there is a God ... Christianity has never
yet had experience of a world simply irreligious. 5
2
Newman to Mother Mary Imelda Poole (December 27, 1872): "I think either
Antichrist is coming, or that a great and purifying trial, which may last centuries,
is coming on the Church. The course of God's Providence is as glorious as it is
awful. I hear, as you do, dreadful accounts of the failings away among our own
people, I mean English people. A lady writes me word this morning, 'It is quite
the exception now to meet in Society a believer'." The Letters and Diaries of
John Henry Newman, ed. Stephen Dessain, et al., [Vols. 1-6 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1978-1984) 11-22; (London: Nelson, 1961-1972) 23-31; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973-1977)] 26: 222. Hereafter referred to as L.D ..
3
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 3: #125; 5: #343, trans. with commentary by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974) 183-184, p. 279.
4
John Henry Cardinal Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua: Being a History of
His Religious Opinions, ed. Martin J. Svaglic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967)
218-219. Hereafter referred to as Apo.
5 John Henry Cardinal Newman, "The Infidelity of the Future" (Sermon at the
opening of St. Bernard's Seminary, Olton, 2 October 1873), Catholic Sermons of
Cardinal Newman (London: Bums and Oates, 1957) 123.
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It was difficult even to speak with great precision about what
was taking place. Univocal terms with which to name this cresting
disbelief were hard to come by. "Atheism" had for centuries
denoted immorality, in a manner that one today might speak of a
person as "godless." So in 1846, George Jacob Holyoake, the last
man tried and imprisoned in England for the blasphemy that was
atheism, coined the term "secularist" indicating an allegiance to a
code of duty pertaining to this life, founded on considerations pure1y human, and intended mainly for those who find theology indefinite or inadequate, unreliable or unbelievable. " 6 In 1869, some
twenty-five years later, Thomas Huxley invented and subsequently
presented to the Metaphysical Society "agnostic" to distinguish his
scepticism from dogmatic denial or affirmation.7 Newman's studies
6

George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism, A Confession of Belief (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1896) 35. The description continued: "Its essential principles are three:
1. The improvement of this life by material means.
2. That science is the available Providence of man.
3. That it is good to do good. Whether there be other good or not, the good of
the present life is good, and it is good to seek that good."
7 Thomas Henry Huxley, "Agnosticism," as in Science and Christian Tradition, Collected Essays, 5 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893-1894) 5: 237-239;
(reprinted Greenwood Publishing Group, May 31, 1970). Of the origin of the
name "agnostic" to cover this attitude, Huxley gave the following account:
"When I reached intellectual maturity and began to ask myself whether I was
an atheist, a theist, or a pantheist; a materialist or an idealist; a Christian or a
freethinker; I found that the more I learned and reflected, the less ready was the
answer; ... The one thing in which most of these good people were agreed was
the one thing in which I differed from them. They were quite sure they had
attained a certain 'gnosis', - had, more or less successfully, solved the problem
of existence; while I was quite sure that I had not, and had a pretty strong conviction that the problem was insoluble ... "
"This was my situation when I had the good fortune to find a place among the
members of that remarkable confraternity of antagonists, long since deceased, but
of green and pious memory, the Metaphysical Society. Every variety of philosophical and theological opinion was represented there, and expressed itself with
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of the early Church had recorded how ambiguously had run his
own chosen term, "atheism." Neither the meaning of the term nor
its applications were precisely fixed, and the range of its indeterminacy contributed to the confusion of the religious controversies
and passions in which it was enlisted.
For the ancient pagans, as Newman noted, "atheists" were those
who denied polytheism; for the Christians, those who affirmed it.
So Julian the Apostate charged that Christians preferred "atheism
to godliness." Indeed, "atheism" was "a popular imputation upon
Christians as it had been before on philosophers and poets, some
of whom better deserved it. " 8 As if in rebuttal, Christians charged
that atheism belongs with the Gentiles who did not know the true
God. Atheism - "godlessness" - came to denote, confusedly in
the polemic exchanges, either those disowning or denying God, or
those disowned by God, or those denying the gods of popular
entire openness; most of my colleagues were -ists of one sort or another; and,
however kind and friendly they might be, I, the man without a rag of a label to
cover himself with, could not fail to have some of the uneasy feelings which must
have beset the historical fox when, after leaving the trap in which his tail remained,
he presented himself to his normally elongated companions. So I took thought,
and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of 'agnostic'. It came
into my head as suggestively antithetic to the 'gnostic' of Church history, who
professed to know so much about the very things of which I was ignorant; and I
took the earliest opportunity of parading it at our Society, to show that I, too, had
a tail, like the other foxes. To my great satisfaction, the term took." R. H. Hutton
in the New English Dictionary, but in a slightly differing account confirms Huxley's authorship. Hutton wrote that the word "was suggested by Huxley at a
meeting held previous to the formation of the now defunct Metaphysical Society
at Mr. Knowles's house on Clapham Common in 1869, in my hearing." See Bill
Young, "The Origin of the Word Agnostic," The Secular Web (June 2004).
http://www.infidels.org/library/rnodern/reason/agnosticism/agnostic.html.
Essays (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893-1894, in Collected Essays, 5: 237239.
8
John Henry Cardinal Newman, Select Treatises of Saint Athanasius, Volume 2,
"Being an Appendix of Illustrations" (London: Pickering and Co., 2 1881) 2:
357.
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religion their appropriate worship, or those denying Jesus Christ as
God.
But by the fourth century, Athanasius could apply the term not
simply to pagans, but to a fellow, albeit heretical, Christian, claiming of Arius that "he is on all sides recognized as godless (atheist,)
Arius," as the same distinguished Alexandrian Father of the Church
had similarly characterized Asterius and V alentinus. Eustathius had
marked the Arians in general as "anthropous atheious," and Arius
himself complained that the Patriarch Alexander had driven him
and his followers from Alexandria as if they were atheists. 9 The
word ranged in and out of inter-Christian controversies. Newman
registered all of this ambiguity, recalling in a letter to John Allen
that in the previous century even the great Joseph Butler had been
accused of "making atheists" by his mode of argumentation, while
Newman associated David Hume with Epicurus as a "teacher of
atheism." 1 For Newman himself, however, "atheism" seems to
mean any of the forms in which one effectively asserts that "there
is no God," and he saw very little difference between such an
assertion and the proposition that "nothing definite can be known
about Him." 11

°

Part One: The Problem
Newman experienced the problem set by this growing atheism not
as a personal temptation, but as a searching contradiction. For the
existence of God, he stated repeatedly, was as certain to him as was
his own existence. 12 "If I am asked why I believe in a God, I
answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible
9

Newman, Select Treatises of Saint Athanasius, 2: 354.
Newman to John Allen (January 8, 1846), L.D., 11 :85-86. See also The Idea
of a University, ed. I. T. Ker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) 49-50. Hereafter
referred to as Idea.
11
Idea, 49.
IO
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to believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure)
without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a
Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience." 13 Yet
there was an epistemological paradox admittedly present within
this conviction: "Of all points of faith, the being of a God, is to
my own apprehension, encompassed with most difficulty, and yet
borne in upon our minds with the most power." 14 "Most difficulty. . . Most power." This incongruity proved the experiential soil
for the profound religious antinomies in the world of the nineteenth
century.
For in the culture around him, what Newman called "the world
of men," he experienced the starkest contravention of his primordial conviction: "The world seems simply to give the lie to that
great truth, of which my whole being is so full." 15 This opposition
did not induce the suspension or the destruction of belief, but it did
evoke a profound confusion - the kind of dislodging confusion,
as he noted, that one would feel before a world become incoherent,
as if the external world had denied Newman's own existence or as
if one had glanced into a mirror and seen no reflection of his face.
A mirror? Because the world, which should reflect its Creator,
instead denied the existence of God, as Newman found, in its "pervading idolatries, the corruptions, the dreary hopeless irreligion,
that condition of the whole race, so fearfully yet exactly described
in the Apostle's words, 'having no hope and without God in the
world'." 16
This contradiction constituted the "profound mystery, which is
absolutely beyond human solution." Atheism for Newman was not
12

13

14
15
16

Apo.,
Apo.,
Apo.,
Apo.,
Apo.,

216.
180 (italics added).
215.
216.
217. Newman is citing Ephesians 2:12.
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a warring of diverse arguments or even divergent positions within
a religious controversy, conflicts into which he readily entered and
in which he felt at home. 17)t exceeded anything that could be
called either schism or heresy. It embodied the most absolute contrariety between foundational religious claims: between the waning
of belief and the voice of conscience in which Newman found the
reality of God as given inescapably. It was a world not so much in
disagreement as deeply inconsequent.
To understand something of the telling strength of this antinomy,
one must recall that Newman insisted upon the indefectibility of
human certitude. Assent is a judgment that such-and-such is the
case. Certitude is reflex or complex assent, the "consciousness of
knowing, as expressed in the phrase, 'I know that I know'." Certitude is thus "an assent to an assent, what is commonly called a
conviction." Now Newman contended, that judicious women and
men are in their convictions only infrequently in error: "Among
fairly prudent and circumspect men, there are far fewer instances
of false certitude than at first sight might be supposed. Men are
often doubtful about propositions which are really true; they are
not commonly certain of such as are simply false. What they judge
to be a certainty is in matter of fact for the most part a truth." 18
This assertion was fundamental to the entire enterprise of A Grammar of Assent, that the way that human beings de facto do reason
is the way they should reason, that there is a connaturality between
the mind and reality such that in general either human convictions
about truth are correct or else one will not be able to rest in them.
It was of critical importance to register "what Certitude is, not
simply as it must be, but in our actual experience of it." 19
17

Apo.,217.
John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, ed. Ian Ker
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 129. Hereafter referred to as GA.
19 GA., 133.
18
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And this experience indicates three conditions that assent become
certitude: (1) that it follows on investigation and proof, (2) that it
is accompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfaction,
(3) that it is irreversible. "If the assent is made without rational
grounds, it is a rash judgment, a fancy, or a prejudice; if without
the sense of finality, it is scarcely more than an inference; if without permanence, it is a mere conviction. " 20 But certitude is the
assent to an assent, and one of its characteristics is its stability.
The difference between simple assent and conviction told in the
character of religious belief: certitude was indefectible not only in
its truth but in its lasting, unshakeable character. While "assents
may and do change; certitudes endure. This is why religion demands
more than an assent to its truth; it requires a certitude, or at least
an assent which is convertible into certitude on demand. Without
certitude in religious faith there may be much decency of profession
and of observance, but there can be no habit of prayer, no directness
of devotion, no intercourse with the unseen, no generosity of selfsacrifice. Certitude then is essential to the Christian. " 21 At a minimum authentic religious belief was the stuff of certitude.
It is true that great numbers of human beings pass through life
without either serious doubt or certitude, even "on the most important proposition that can occupy their minds." Their judgments are
only those of simple assent, the beliefs and opinions by which
human beings live, which usually forms the fabric of the ordinary,
the day-by-day beliefs and sometimes the texture of their allegiances - human beings who "having very little intellectual training,
have never had the temptation to doubt, and never the opportunity
to be certain." The faith of the medievals was such, but it possessed what was essential for religious assent, i.e., a material or

20
21

G.A., 168.
G.A., 144.
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interpretative certitude. Their religious belief had only to be questioned in order to develop into that explicit reflex assent that could
be called certitude. One might term all authentic religious belief a
latent certitude. 22
How, then, could religious faith fail in Europe - fail not in this
or that instance, nor simply with the superficial and thoughtless,
but fail with serious and reflective thinkers such as George Eliot,
Matthew Arnold, and Newman's great friend William Froude, fail
from group to group, even from national culture to national culture,
and that religious belief fail which was as evident to Newman as
his own existence? Does one deny that religious belief with its
interpretative certitude had been present in the centuries past?
Certainly Newman did not. Yet all over Europe, one saw religious
belief decline through the centuries that formed modernity and in
so many instances finally fail. This failure constituted for Newman
the scandal of the nineteenth century. How was it possible that
propositions accepted for thousands of years, acts of assent to religious truth which were at least material certitudes, convictions for
which men and women went to their deaths through the centuries,
religious knowledge as well as religious belief that were so much
of the texture of the culture - how could all of this fail, and fail
so pervasively and with such rapidity as these shadows lengthened
over Europe? How was it possible that the intellect, as a matter of
fact, could not keep the religious truth it had for centuries preserved? The question, again, is not just Newman's. Nietzsche's
madman asked the same question: "How did we do this? How
could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away
the entire horizon?" 23 This for Newman constitutes the contradiction
that demanded resolution.

22
23

G.A.,138-139.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science 3: #125, p. 181.
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Part Two: The Ambiguity of Intellect
Newman located the rising destruction of religious belief proximately in the corruption of reason, but this diagnosis mirrored in
its complexity the very oppositions it was invoked to explain.
No one celebrated the human intellect more wisely and more
lyrically than Newman. "Right reason" could come to the knowledge that God exists, that the soul is immortal, that future retribution awaits the evil. Indeed, these are the basic beliefs of "natural
religion,"

and reason even unaided by grace but exercised with

integrity could discover them. 24 Knowledge could be its own end
and the university has for its purpose neither art nor utility nor even
duty, but intellectual culture: "Here it may leave its scholars, and
it has done its work when it has done as much as this. It educates
the intellect to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth,
and to grasp it. " 25 But in the brilliant promise of intellect lay its
liabilities for cancerous self-destruction.
Newman discovered very early in his life that the intellect could
corrupt as well as enhance the human spirit. Under the influence
of the Oriel Noetics, especially Richard Whately, Newman found
himself in 1827 gradually "beginning to prefer intellectual excellence to moral," a realization to which he was awakened by a
partial breakdown and the death of his youngest sister, Mary. 26
Right reason could indeed lead one to natural religion. But such
reason seems an abstraction before "Reason, considered as a real
agent in the world, and as an operative principle in man's nature,
with an historical course and with definite results. " 27 It takes a very
different -

24

25
26
27

Apo.,
Idea,
Apo.,
Idea,

a disordered -

course; it "considers itself from first

218; G.A., 251-263; Idea, 157.
114.
26.
157.
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to last independent and supreme; it requires no external authority;
it makes a religion for itself. " 28 Such was the critically realistic or
- if you will -the pessimistic assessment of Newman, a judgment that remained throughout his life. The arrogance of reason
obtains when the human intellect charts the divine insistently within the coordinates of its own capacities and experiences, i.e., when
it considers itself so naturally and adequately equipped for the
knowledge about God that it refuses to admit any disclosures of
the divine that transcend these human parameters. This was "rationalism" for Newman, "a certain abuse of Reason; that is, a use of
it for purposes for which it never was intended, and is unfitted.
To rationalize in matters of Revelation is to make our reason the
standard and measure of the doctrines revealed. " 29
Religious rationalism collapsed the distinction between capacities for the human and capacities for the divine. Feuerbach and
Freud were advancing a strikingly similar reduction of content of
the divine to the human, that the divine was nothing more than the
human either writ large or writ paternal and extending this analysis
to claim that this was the underlying object in all religious belief,
a projection of the human onto an imaginary subject. Newman did
not deny that such an event took place, especially in the overextensions of reason. Indeed he saw it as the project of rationalism and
the cancerous destruction of all authentic faith.
Accept this, that the mode of the human is to determine the
understanding of God, and you have the arrogance, the disorder
of intellect. Even if this disordered intellect accepts a religious
faith, it does so on its own terms. God is reduced to fit the human
28

Idea, 157.
John Henry Newman, "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into
Revealed Religion," Tract 73 as in Tracts for the Times (1836), largely reprinted
in Newman the Theologian, ed. Ian Ker (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1990) 75.
29
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capacities to understand. God is like a human being - only bigger.
Here also, the human reason is still liable to the blindness of selfinterest, to the deception and energies of the passions, to historical
conditioning and unattended motivations - and liable to them in proportion as it considered its own excellence as proof against them.
In considering reason within the concrete history of "fallen
man" as well as of salvation, Newman wrote: "I am considering
the faculty of reason actually and historically; and in this point of
view, I do not think I am wrong in saying that its tendency is
towards a simple unbelief in matters of religion. No truth, however sacred, can stand against it, in the long run." He spoke repeatedly of "the all-corroding, all-dissolving scepticism of the intellect
in religious inquiries. " 30 Rationalism or liberalism - "the antidogmatic principle" - was very simply not the appropriate use of
reason, but its abuse, its abstraction from the broader contexts of
religious life and authority and its employment beyond its orientation and capacity, for the reduction of revealed Mystery to a manageable and obvious set of affirmations. The human mind is made
the measure of the reality of God, nothing can be told it which it
cannot comprehend and ground for itself, and that which remains
obscure and unmastered is discarded. "And this, it is to be feared,
is the spirit in which multitudes of us act at the present day. " 31
The effect is inevitable: the pretensions of a finite intellect to an
adequacy and an autonomy that is preposterously unwarranted gradually devolve from its initial and rationalistic claims into the ineluctable fate of the rationalist, a bitter and pervasive scepticism. The
sceptic is often little more than the deeply disappointed rationalist.
Reason moves most damagingly in this latter direction when it
corrodes the human conscience. It is here that Newman finds the
30

Apo., 218.
Newman, "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed
Religion," 76.
31
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possibilities of atheism. For the natural informants or evidence for
the existence of God available to all human beings are three: the
human conscience, the voice and testimony of humankind, and the
system and course of the world. 32 And the greatest of these was
conscience. 33 Indeed, were it not for conscience, an assessment of
the other two informants, i.e., of the course of the world and the
directions of human beings, would have left Newman an atheist or
a pantheist or a polytheist. 34 The fundamental natural witness to the
reality of God was conscience. It is here above all that one looks
for the substantiation of the conviction that God exists. 35 If conscience is corrupted or misunderstood or deadened or neglected,
there is nothing that can take its place.
For Newman, the fundamental religious battle is joined in the
nineteenth century between conscience and what he called "the
ordinary sin of the intellect." For the corruption of conscience is a
constant threat in a civilized age, "its besetting sin." Not that one
denies conscience, but rather that one transposes or translates it
into another, a weaker idiom: "conscience tends to become what
is called a moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin
is not an offence against God, but against human nature. " 36

32

For a remarkable parallel to this triad, cf. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 3:
#357, pp. 304-310.
33 GA., 251: "By Religion I mean the knowledge of God, of His Will, and of
our duties towards Him; and there are three main channels which Nature furnishes
for our acquiring this knowledge, viz. our own minds, the voice of mankind, and
the course of the world, that is, of human life and human affairs ... And the most
authoritative of these three means of knowledge, as being specially our own, is
our own mind whose informations give us the rule by which we test, interpret,
and correct what is presented to us for belief, whether by the universal testimony
of mankind, or by the history of society and of the world."
34
Apo., 216.
35 GA., 72-83.
36
Idea, 165.
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So Newman could write to Henry Parry Liddon this short note
in which he named both the kind of adversary and the kind of
devolution consequent upon the weakening and destruction of conscience: "What you say about Arnold's new book is most painful.
But if the generation will give up as superstitious the moral and
religious instincts of the mind, not the most logical arguments in
behalf of their truth will serve to re-establish them. I have often
thought how soon I might get over the sense that murder, as such,
is a sin (I am not speaking of the natural horror one has of cruelty
- or of murder as in particular cases an injustice) but of murder
as such - after I have killed half a dozen persons. I suppose some
nurses (not farrning nurses) have not any great horror at the idea
of killing children. And thus the idea of God may go. " 37 To understand the emergence of atheism, then, one must understand the
religious character of the human conscience and its corruption.
For Newman contended that just as the witness the senses make
possible the apprehension of the visible world, so the judgment of
conscience serves for the existence of God.

Part Three: Conscience
One recognizes conscience intuitively, that is, through the same
internal self-appropriation by which the mind comes to awareness
of memory, sensation, and reasoning, i.e., as an act of the mind.
A distinction of terms is essential here. One has "faith" in what is
external, what is other; but one "intuits" what is internal and part
of one's consciousness: "I would draw a broad line betwe·en what
is within us and without us, and apply the word 'faith' to our reliance <certainty> of things without and not within. us ... Surely there
37

Newman to H.P. Liddon (March 2, 1873), L.D., 26:268. Newman is referring to Matthew Arnold's Literature and Dogma: An Essay towards a Better
Apprehension of the Bible.
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are things prior to faith. I apply the word 'intuition' to such ... Taking the acts of the mind to bits, therefore, knowledge of my existence is the fourth act; though I call all four one complex act of
intuition. Here we have real intuition, but I have faith, not intuition,
of the external world. " 38 One intuits conscience, and one believes
in the external fact that conscience delivers - as an object not of
intuition but of faith - that is, the existence of God. This external
fact is more intimately connected with what is intuited than anything else. " 39 The existence of God is an object of faith in one of
Newman's peculiar meanings of this word, i.e., the conviction
which arises from what is internal [conscience] about an external
fact [God] and which is "different in evidence <proof> from every
other external fact. " 40
Newman is quite consciously transposing the grounds for demonstrating the existence of God from the external world to the inner,
conscious world of the thinking subject. In this, he is following the
current of fundamental thinking set in motion by John Locke and
reaching its crest in the nineteenth century with Kant and Hegel
- though Newman was neither a Kantian nor a Hegelian. But he
agrees with that whole intellectual world in what Richard McKeon
would call its "selection," the fundamental area that must be
explored and out of which one would derive the crucial categories
and predicates of thought. With Newman's "epistemological selection," one investigates the processes of thought to establish warrants for the assertion about things. Intuition is prior to faith.
Like "experience" for William James, "conscience" for Newman is a double-barreled word. It denotes both the recognition of
38
John Henry Newman, The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman,
ed. Edward Sillem, 2 vols. (New York/Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1969-1970) 2:71.
Hereafter referred to as P.N.
39
P.N., 2:43.
40
P.N., 2:41; see also p. 39.
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the moral content of a situation - in the ethical judgment both of
what is right and good and what is wrong and evil - or the consequent and experienced imperative, the demand that one should
do the right or good and avoid the wrong or evil. "The feeling of
conscience" is thus twofold - but the two are indivisibly one.
Conscience is, then, "a moral sense and a sense of duty." The first
is a judgment of reason and functions as the principle or source of
morals or ethics; the second is a "magisterial dictate" and functions as the principle of religion. 41 The first is the rule of right
conduct; the second is the summons to and the sanction of right
conduct. Newman believed that this second contained the primary
and most authoritative aspect of conscience as well as bore the
ordinary sense of the word. For "half the world would be puzzled
to know what was meant by the moral sense [the first use of the
term]; but every one knows what is meant by a good or bad conscience. " 42
Conscience as dictate was experienced metaphorically as
"a voice, or the echo of a voice, imperative and constraining, like
no other dictate in the whole of our experience. " 43 The experience
of this dictate comprises two moments: antecedent to choice, in its
sense of obligation that such and such is to be done or avoided;
subsequent to choice, in the "sanction to that testimony [of conscience] conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or wrong
conduct. " 44 Newman's argument "from conscience" for the existence of God comprises both of these moments in the recognition of
obligation, i.e., of what is to be done or should have been done, and
also the emotions or feelings that it elicits. He argues that in the
unsurpassable and absolute character of the command, one experiences
41

42

43
44

GA.,
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the sovereign moral government of our lives quo majus nihil; in
the emotions that attend the command - whether fulfilled or dismissed - one experiences that this government is personal, i.e., it
is the government by a person. Let us consider each of these.
The phenomena or intimations of conscience are the experiences of moral obligation or responsibility: "You should do this; you
should omit that." Human perception identifies these intimations
of conscience as the reverberations of an admonition in some way
other than the subject, i.e., in these dictates, conscience is registering the commanding - even sovereign - direction given by
another. One is not simply identifiable with his or her conscience.
Neither did one create or excite this sense of obligation - any
more than one created or excited the experience of an external
world. One found it - or, if you prefer, one was found by it. Conscience recognizes something or someone that is other. "What I
am insisting on here," wrote Newman, "is this: that it [conscience]
commands; that it praises, <it> blames, it threatens, it implies a
future, & it witnesses of the unseen. It is more than a man's own
self The man himself has not power over it, or only with extreme
difficulty; he did not make it, he cannot destroy it. He may silence
it in particular cases or directions; he may distort its enunciations;
but he cannot, or it is quite the exception if he can, he cannot
emancipate himself from it. He can disobey it; he [-can] <may>
refuse to use it; but it remains. This is Conscience. " 45 It is irreducibly other.
Conscience is also irreducibly morally and religiously supreme.
One recognizes - note: recognizes without demonstration or proof
- that the claim of conscience is superior to every other claim in
one's life. It must be followed no matter what the opposition. It is in
this sense absolute - as opposed to hypothetically or conditionally
45

P.N., 2:53.
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necessary. It is not another precept in the universe or in consciousness, but supreme over all. Human beings recognize in conscience
a moral imperative that should rule over all of their other choices
and actions. Thus, conscience in its dictates is the supreme governor.
It is also pervasive. It is present in every option a human being
confronts and in every choice a human being makes: to permit, to
forbid, to command, to urge. And if conscience is both sovereign
and pervasive, then the source of conscience must be in this
way sovereign and pervasive. But is its source personal; is it of a
person?
In his University Sermon of 1830, Newman seems to have contended that a natural religion founded on conscience could reveal
"no points of his [God's] personal character. 46 But he came to
perceive that it is the instinct of the human mind to recognize in
the data or commands of conscience "an external Master" as it is
the instinct of the mind, indeed, "of brute nature" to recognize in
the data of sense perception an external world. 47 And this instinctive perception of the personal in the imperatives of conscience
seemed to him to be expressed most clearly in the emotions that
surrounded the dictates of conscience.
Before a choice is made, one feels the sense of responsibility or
obligation for the choice that is to be made; after choice, one feels
the sense of satisfaction or shame. "Responsibility" - to whom?
"Shame" - before whom? An experience of responsibility or fear
or shame implies "that there is One to whom we are responsible,
46

John Henry Newman, University Sermons: Fifteen Sermons Preached
Before the University of Oxford, 1826-1843, introd. D. M. MacKinnon and
J. D. Holmes (reprinted from the third edition, London: SPCK, 1970) 2:22-23.
See the remarks of Ian Ker in G.A., 359 (n. 73) and of Edward Sillem in P.N.,
2:31 (n. 2).
47
G.A., 76; see also pp. 71-72.
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before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. " 48
One does not feel shame before a stone or a horse or a dog; one
feels no remorse even about breaking a merely human precept.
When one has violated the claims of conscience in a serious matter,
however, there is nothing visible necessarily to which we feel this
sense of unalloyed responsibility or before which we feel shame
and fear, no one or no thing visible whose claims we, through these
emotions, recognize as definitive. 49
Conscience in this manner is like no other experience that human
beings undergo, and its reference to the personal other is embodied
concretely in this manifold range of spontaneous human emotions:
"reverence and awe, hope and fear, especially fear, a feeling which
is foreign for the most part, not only to Taste, but even to the Moral
Sense, except in consequence of accidental associations. " 50 In
these emotions, one recognizes that the Other, the source of the
imperative, has already been accepted as personal. One may be
mortified if his actions have been ugly, but he feels responsible and
guilty if his actions have been immoral.
These various perturbations of mind which are characteristic of a bad
conscience, and may be very considerable, - self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the
future, - and their contraries, when the conscience is good, as real
though less forcible, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart,
and the like, - these emotions constitute a specific difference
between conscience and our other intellectual senses, - common
sense, good sense, sense of expedience, taste, sense of honor, and the
like, - as indeed they would also constitute between conscience and
the moral sense, supposing these two were not aspects of one and the
same feeling, exercised upon one and the same subject-matter. 51
48
49
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These emotions are such as to indicate that their "exciting
cause," to which they refer, must be personal.
Newman is not saying that conscience or the imperatives of conscience are God - they remain finite and human and fallible - but
he is saying that these are the shadow and the evidence of God, the
phenomena or the impressions or the experience from which the
intellect instinctively moves to the assertion of God. 52They are the
created effect of God, the finite participation in and experience of
the sovereignty of God. One has the experience in this command
of an undeniable absolute. While conscience is not God, it is, nevertheless, repeatedly named "an echo of God." For finite as it is,
it makes a claim upon our lives that is supreme and unsurpassable
and omnipresent.
Thus in summary for Newman, both the superiority and pervasiveness of the claim of conscience over every other claim disclose
the matchless supremacy of this Other to which conscience points,
while the attendant emotions evoked by conscience disclose that
this Other is already and implicitly recognized as personal.
How is Newman arguing here? Is he saying that we feel obligation and consequently we imply that there must be an all powerful
source? Is Newman's God still the God of inference, but now
the evidence from which inference moves is the sense of duty? Or
is he saying that God is given in the very act of obligation itself?
In scholastic terminology, is obligation a signum quod of the
divine reality or a signum in quo - is obligation like smoke from
which we infer fire or like a handshake in which we experience
friendship?
The answer to this question is not always clear in Newman.53 But his mind seems to have come down upon the second
52

P.N., 2:53.
For the difficulty in understanding Newman's position, see Newman to
W. G. Ward (November 26, 1859) L.D., 19:247. See also P.N., 2:53.
53
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alternative with his acknowledgement of "instinct," namely, that
by a "singularly congenial" movement, an instinct of the mind
"recognizes" God in the imperative of conscience in a manner
which parallels, for Newman, the "faith" in an external world. The
evidence that there are things external to us is the impression the
phenomena make upon our senses, "and our warrant for taking
these for evidence is our instinctive certitude that they are evidence. " 54 It is through instinct that human beings affirm an external
world; it is through instinct that they affirm that God is given
in their conscience. This instinctual recognition would explain
Newman's contention in the Apologia that there were "two and
only two absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and
my Creator. " 55 "Self-evident?" The word is important. Through
intuition, the self is given; to the faith that arises out of the instinctive recognition of conscience, God is given. 56
In his Philosophical Notebook, Newman summarized his argument: "If then our <my> knowledge of our <my> existence is
brought ** home to me by my consciousness of thinking, and if

54

GA., 71. Similarly, human beings come by instinct to recognize the character of particular authors - a Cicero or a Jerome - from the phenomena of
their writings. See GA., 72.
55
Apo., 18.
56 James Collins records that in Newman's private notes, he lists four main
reasons for his choice of the proof from conscience, the first of which is indicated
here. But Collins adds: "Second, the proof from conscience is not a purely theoretical process and does not stop at a purely abstract truth. Instead, it makes us
aware of God at the center of our freedom. It is personal, not only in its point of
departure, but also in apprehending God precisely as a personal judge and providential guide. Hence this inference ordinarily yields both a speculative truth and
a practical commitment of the finite person to God as a person. It is the source of
a moral and religious relationship with God and thus overcomes the deficiencies
of the proof from design." See James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1959) 362-363, 444 (n. 47). See P.N.,
2:67.
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thinking includes as one of its modes conscience or the sense of an
imperative coercive law, & if such a sense, when [analyzed, i.e.
when] reflected on, involves an inchoate recognition of a Divine
Being, it follows that such recognition comes close upon my recognition that I am, and is only not so clear an object of perception
as is my own existence. " 57And again to W. G. Ward: "Conscience,
or the sense of moral obligation on my mind is such, as distinctly
to carry with it the sense of an Obliger; or that the immediate shape
with which it comes to me is, not that of a divine truth, but of a
divine command or will. The immediate form need not be the ultimate basis. I have only said that my conscience is to me a proof of
a God, just as a shadow is a proof of a substance. The shadow does
not depend upon the mere arbitrary will of the substance for its
shape, but on the nature of the substance. " 58 Conscience always
entails a keen sense of obligation and responsibility. God is given
to human experience aboriginally as the whence of obligation and
the whither of responsibility.
Newman believed that the argument from conscience was the
demonstration available to all of humankind, that it lay at the basis
of natural religion. Just as the burden of the Grammar of Assent
was to assert the justification of the belief of the uneducated, so the
argument from conscience extended this justification by making as
a principle of religion what was common to all human beings, the
unlearned and the learned. 59 And the Grammar insisted upon this
57

P.N., 2:63.
Newman to W. G. Ward (November 26, 1859) L.D., 19: 247.
59 GA., 251. It is interesting that Hegel, for vastly different reasons, locates
the transition of Spirit into religion in the form of conscience: "Der sich selbst
wissende Geist ist in der Religion unmittelbar sein eignes reines selbstbewufitsein.
Diejenigen Gestalten desselben, die betrachtet worden, - der wahre, der sich
entfremdete und der seiner selbst gewisse Geist - machen zusammen ihn in
seinem BewuBtsein aus, das seiner Welt gegeniiber tretend in ihr sich nicht
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point: "Our great internal teacher of religion is, as I have said in
an earlier part of this Essay, our Conscience. Conscience is a personal guide, and I use it because I must use myself; I am as little
able to think by any mind but my own as to breathe with another's
lungs. Conscience is nearer to me than any other means of knowledge. And as it is given to me, so also it is given to others; and
being carried about by every individual in his own breast, and
requiring nothing besides itself, it is thus adapted for the communication to each separately of that knowledge which is most
momentous to him individually, - adapted for the use of all classes
and conditions of men, for high and low, young and old, men and
women, independently of books, of educated reasoning, of physical
knowledge or of philosophy. " 60 Whatever one says about the manner of the divine self-disclosure through conscience, so concrete,
so sharp is this image of God, gained in this manner, that it can
elict real assent.
Why is this voice, the voice of conscience an "echo" of the
voice of God? Because it is so absolute, so sovereign. It is not
God, but it participates in the absoluteness of God. It is "the main
guide of the soul," governing as sovereign everything a person
does, surpassing in its government every other claim, and at the
same time pervading an entire life - no time and no place escapes
its commands. Sunshine implies a sun, even if unseen; knocking
on the door implies the presence of one asking for admittance, so

iiberhaupt, so auch seine Vorstellung und seine bestirnrnten Begriffe und ist nun
bei sich seiendes SelbstbewuBtsein. In diesem hat er fiir sich, als Gegenstand
vorgestellt, die Bedeutung, der allgemeine Geist zu sein, der alles Wesen und alle
Wirklichkeit in sich enthalt; ist aber nicht in der Form freier Wirklichkeit oder
der selbstandig erscheinenden Natur." Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phiinomenologie des Geistes; nach dem Texte der Orginalausgabe herausgegeben von
Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952), #677, pp. 474-475.
60
GA.,251.
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do these commands "necessarily raise our minds to the idea of a
Teacher, an unseen Teacher. " 61
[A Tentative Excursus: If one wished to ask a metaphysical
rather than an epistemological question: How, one might inquire,
does conscience relate to the causality of God? How does it come
forth from God in a manner so precise that it can serve to lay upon
human beings the authority of God? As we have insisted, Newman
is rich in metaphors and similes, calling it the "echo of a voice,"
the "reverberations of an external admonition," "the shadow" of
the substance of God; he compares it to the knocking on the door
by someone requesting entrance and to the sunshine or light given
by the sun. God not only gives conscience its being, but uniquely
specifies its nature. It participates in His absolute authority, without
being God. Conscience seems a created participation in or expression of God as sovereign good:, sovereign, as supreme moral ruler;
good, as that of which every other created good is exemplified.
If this is true, then the activity of conscience resembles in its ontological structure the character of contemplation in John of the
Cross, i.e., "the overshadowing" of the attributes of God. 62 ]

Objection
But isn't Newman simply divinizing the superego [Uber-Ich] of
later Freudian psychoanalytic theory, the agency among the triadic
agencies of the mind whose functions are both the supervision and
the judging and punishing of human deeds? Freud equates the
61

John Henry Cardinal Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions
(new impression, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927) 65. See P.N., 2:53
and Newman to Ward (November 26, 1859), L.D., 19:247.
62
See John of the Cross, "The Living Flame," Stanza 3 with Commentary, as
in Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodrigues, The Collected Works of Saint John
of the Cross (revised edition, Washington, DC: Institute for Carmelite Studies,
1991) 673ff.
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judging feature of superego with conscience, and, can, like Newman, speak of the "voice of conscience. " 63 How similar is the
doctrine of Newman to the superego's influence as detailed by
Freud: "I feel an inclination to do something that I think will give
me pleasure, but I abandon it on the ground that my conscience
does not allow it. Or I have let myself be persuaded by too great
an expectation of pleasure into doing something to which the voice
of conscience has objected and after the deed my conscience punishes me with distressing reproaches and causes me to feel remorse
for the deed. " 64 Both Newman and Freud have conscience as dictate. And could not Newman's list of the consequences of a bad
conscience be equally at home with the catalogue of emotions
assigned to Freud's superego: "self-reproach, poignant shame,
haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the future? " 65
Further, the personal is present in these exercises of the superego,
maintains Freud, because the superego originates in the internalization by the child of the parental superego or ego-ideal, and it
"observes, directs and threatens the ego in exactly the same way
as earlier the parents did with the child. " 66 Indeed Freud sees the
superego as the mechanism that binds aggression, that shapes the
renunciation of the outward expression of aggression and turns it
inwardly into guilt. "In Freud's oedipal perspective, the renunciation of the instincts (sex and aggression) is motivated by castration
anxiety (fear)" that shapes the characterizes the superego. 67

63

Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, trans. and
ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1964) 74-75.
64 Freud, New Introductory Lectures, 74-75.
65 G.A., 75.
66
Freud, New Introductory Lectures, 77.
67 I am grateful here to Professor Diane Jonte-Pace of Santa Clara University
for these summary comments on the origins of the superego and Freud's own
criticism of a superego morality.
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There is no time adequate here to give this objection the careful
examination it deserves, but a number of characteristics might offer
some indications that this objection does not pose a definitive end
to Newman's finding the presence of God within the dictates of
conscience. Perhaps one could distinguish Newman's conscience
and Freud's super-ego in terms of four parameters: conscious
awareness, rationality, freedom, and dominant emotions. Let us
look briefly at each.
One must first recognize, that the Freudian superego or ego-ideal
was itself - as conditioning can often be - primarily "unconscious and inaccessible to the ego. " 68 This means more than simply
producing unconscious effects. It means, as Freud wrote in The
New Introductory Lectures to Psycho-Analysis, that "large portions
of the ego and super-ego can remain unconscious and are normally unconscious. That is to say, the individual knows nothing of
their contents and it requires an expenditure of effort to make them
conscious. " 69 In its unconscious state, Gregory Zilboorg emphasizes, Freud's superego is the "precipitate of all the demands and
commands and particularly of the taboos connected with what is
known as 'the oedipus complex'. " 70 In contrast, Newman's imperative of conscience is emphatic in its consciousness, following as
68

Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere, ed. James Strachey
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1960) 36.
69
Freud, New Introductory Lectures, 87. "We call a psychical process unconscious whose existence we are obliged to assume - for some such reason as that
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the same relation to it as we have to a psychical process in another person, except
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obliged to assume that it is being activated at the moment, though at the moment
we know nothing about it." Ibid., 88.
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Gregory Zilboorg, "Superego and Conscience," Conscience: Theological
and Psychological Perspectives, ed. C. Ellis Nelson (New York: Newman Press,
1973) 218.
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it does in its indivisible unity with the first moment of conscience,
the rational judgment between good and evil. This prior moral
judgment is - for all of its attendant emotions, Newman underlines - "a judgment of the reason. " 71 Indeed, conscience as a
moral sense is "an intellectual sentiment. " 72
Reason as such has virtually no role to play in the formation or
the agency of the superego. It is more a conditioning or compulsion from without, an introjection especially of the father's authority. Indeed, "Freud usually discusses the superego as oedipal,
involving fear of punishment, castration anxiety, and renuntiation" .73 But it is brought about and strengthened more generally
by the conditioning of parental and societal expectations. One is
conditioned to accept certain things and reject others. This stands
in contrast with Newman's rational dictate bearing upon that
whose goodness or rationality one has consciously and reasonably
recognized. When the super-ego develops into a pathological
extreme, it resembles in its exaggerations compulsive hand-washings, obsessive actions to which one is driven by a sense of guilt
and whose values obtain simply as a displacement of object and
an escape from unrecognized guilt. In some contrast, Newman's
moral commands are a second moment of conscience, the experience of absolute obligation following upon the moral differentiation of good from evil. Moral judgment and moral imperative are
distinct aspects of conscience, but only that; the act that unites
them into a unity is conscience, and conscience is indivisible. 74
Newman emphasizes that moral judgment and moral imperative
are two aspects "of one and the same feeling, exercized upon one
71

G.A., 73.
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articulation of the origin of the superego in the oedipal experience.
74
G.A., 73.
72

94

MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY

and the same subject-matter. " 75 Perhaps it is precisely in this indivisibility that the superego and Newman's conscience so strongly
and evidently differ. The imperatives of conscience follow upon
the rational recognition of good and evil - not upon the uneasy
feeling and compulsive susceptibilities evoked from previous conditioning. If the judgment of right and wrong is not of reason, it is
not of conscience for Newman. In fact, the moral judgments of
conscience and the dictate consequently upon them can sometimes
be at loggerheads with compulsive emotions of attraction or repulsion generated by conditioning. Conscience can even contradict the
superego.
In the superego, it is the historical past that dominates, and the
precepts and prohibitions about the present or the future come out
of the earliest object choices desired by the id. 76 These dictates
bring as prohibitions into the present the parental ego-ideals and
the guilt and threat one has undergone repeatedly in the past when
these ideals were threatened or not realized. Newman's conscience
speaks to freedom, to an experience of self-responsibility or selfdetermination, while the superego speaks to and evokes constraints
and past conditioning. The person, moved by conscience to act,
feels called, summoned, directed to follow the actions she recognizes as right or good. As she confronts this choice, she will have
a radical sense of her own freedom, of her responsibility for what
she deliberates about and chooses; indeed, the responsibility for
her entire life.
75
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Freud, The Ego and the Id, 31: The origin of the super-ego is "the outcome
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dependence, and the fact of his Oedipus complex, the repression of which we have
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As conscience and the superego are different in the character of
their command, so they are different in the emotions they principally evoke. For Newman's conscience, the principal emotion was
fear; for Freud's superego, the principal emotion was shame and
guilt. In the Idea of a University, Newman was at pains to distinguish his sense of conscience and its religious significance from
the disgust, humiliation and shame that come over the cultivated,
but conditioned mind when it realizes its self-betrayal into vice.
"When the mind is simply angry with itself and nothing more,
surely the true import of the voice of nature and the depth of its
intimations have been forgotten, and a false philosophy has misinterpreted emotions which ought to lead to God. "Fear implies the
transgression of a law, and a law implies a lawgiver and judge,"
but the tendency of "intellectual culture is to swallow up the fear
in the self-reproach, and the self-reproach is directed and limited
to our mere sense of what is fitting and becoming. Fear carries us
out of ourselves, whereas shame may act upon us only within the
round of our own thoughts. " 77 John Glaser has, consequently,
pointed out that the characteristic of the superego is its narcissism:
the need to be right, correct so that one is approvable, lovable. The
shame resulting from the violation of previous conditioning entails
the fear of isolation, of being abandoned because one is not lovable. "The thematic center is a sense of one's own value. " 78
One need not deny that conscience in Newman's sense can be
and often initially is mingled and confused with the superego just as true worship and prayer often embody many false and
superstitious practices without themselves being superstitious, or
as a false prophet can for a time be indistinguishable from a true
77
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prophet. Even further, one need not deny that the conditioning that
is the superego can command and habituate one to practices that
conscience will demand and confirm. But it is obviously of crucial
importance to distinguish them. Newman argues that the experience of responsibility and fear are both interpersonal, i.e., that both
of these feelings essentially involve another person: "If, as is the
case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to
whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose
claims upon us, we fear. " 79 Such feelings as moral obligation
before duty and fear before transgression "require for their exciting
cause an intelligent being." The absolute character of the imperative indicate the sovereign character of this other. So the mind
spontaneously recognizes "the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme
Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and
is the creative principle of religion. " 80 If conscience, containing
both this experience and its recognition, stands as the principle, the
source of all religious affirmation, then it becomes critically important for Newman's reading of the rise of atheism. It is important to
note that Newman - in contrast with the quinque viae of St. Thomas or the solar system with Newton or the contingency of matter
with Samuel Clarke or physical design with Paley - offers as the
principal evidence for the reality of God an experience that is
intrinsically religious. God is given with conscience. Conscience
would have to be corrupted in order to corrupt belief in the reality
of God. That means that the loss of a sense of God can fundamentally only be moral.
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Part Four: Rejected Alternatives
But what about other sources in nature that would offer warrant or
demonstration for the existence of God? Truth to tell, Newman
reposed very little credence in the other two natural informants
about God, ones commonly cited in the apologetic manuals of his
time, and this reserve indicates how much foundational importance
he was ascribing to the witness of conscience.
The first of these was that of universal consensus, one embodied
in the rites and devotions and practices extant in the history of
religions. One must here identify religion in its primitive state,
founded on a sense of sin, structured with precepts that reflect this
origin, and requiring expiation, reconciliation, and some great
change in human conduct. Such religion was the natural, albeit
primitive, expression of conscience. 81 Later developments, the religions of civilized times and those of philosophy, are not developments of this primordial religion but its perversion or contradiction,
"recognizing a moral sense - ethics - but ignoring conscience."
This is but "artificial religion," issuing only out of a development
of the human intellect, "a one-sided progress of mind," and a contradiction to the fundamental religious principle, conscience. 82
The third natural informant, celebrated in the theologies that
issued from the mechanics of the previous century and synthesized
in such works as Paley's Natural Theology lay with the world of
nature, the system of the universe, its order and precision.
It includes both human life and human affairs. But what actually
strikes the mind confronted with the course of nature is not the
presence of God, but His absence - the dismay "that His control
of this living world is so indirect and His action so obscure. This
is the first lesson that we gain from the course of human affairs.
81
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What strikes the mind so forcibly and so painfully is, his absence,
(if I may so speak) from His own world. " 83
It is true, as Edward Sillem notes, that Newman admitted the
demonstrative value of arguments from the material universe, but
"he held, that if these arguments are not regarded as corollaries to
the argument from conscience, they are of no religious value. " 84
Before the world of nature alone, one confronts not the voice of
God as in conscience, but the silence of God. "It is a silence that
speaks. It is as if an other had got possession of His work. " 85 For
in this world of system and pattern, God does not appear and a
thousand "why's" come out of human experience with nature:
Why does God not give us more immediate knowledge of His reality? Why does He allow events to move in their observed way
without divine order? Why is He not more forthcoming about
Himself, His will, His providence? God does not appear. "On the
contrary, He is specially 'a Hidden God;' and with our best efforts
we can only glean from the surface of the world some faint and
fragmentary views of Him. " 86
Only human conscience can give answers to the questions posed
by nature, not nature itself. Before this hiddenness of God in
nature and in the course of human events, Newman saw only two
alternatives: either God did not exist or God has disowned His
creation. For Newman, it was a "great question whether atheism
is not as philosophically consistent with the phenomena of the
physical world, taken by themselves, as the doctrine of a creative
and governing Power." The religious question is whether physical
phenomena teach human beings or remind human beings of the
83
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reality of God. If they do not, the lack lies with the dispositions of
the person, with his or her failure to bring to bear those moral
principles by which these data may be interpreted religiously. 87
The religious interpretation must be made to tell in the theological
assessment of nature because "I believe that the study of Nature,
when religious feeling is away, leads the mind, rightly or wrongly,
to acquiesce in the atheistic theory, as the simplest and easiest. " 88
Even if one is successful in inferring from the data of the physical
sciences the existence of divine power and divine skill, none of
them can teach God as Moral Governor: "The essence of Religion
is the idea of a Moral Governor and a particular Providence; now
let me ask, is the doctrine of moral governance and a particular
providence conveyed to us through the physical sciences at all? " 89
This gave the consistent direction to his apologetics: "For myself,
as my writings show, I have never based the belief in a God on any
argument from merely external nature, but simply as implied in the
fact and deducible from the existence of conscience, nor do I see
any difficulty in the notion of the existence of a being endued with
reason (at least in its lower degrees) yet without a conscience."
Indeed, Newman would go further and make conscience the condition for the possibility of belief: "Because he had no conscience,
he would have no idea of a God. " 90
This reservation ran contrary to the physico-theologies of the
time, i.e., to the argument from Newton's universe and Paley's
87 John Henry Newman, "Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind,"
in Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford (London: Long-

mans, Green, and Co., 1909) 194.
88 John Henry Newman, "Secular Knowledge without Personal Religion tends
to Unbelief," in Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects (London: Longmans Green, and Co., 1899) 300.
89 Newman, "Secular Knowledge," in Discussions and Arguments on Various
Subjects, 303.
90 Newman to George William Cox (January 28, 1865), L.D., 21:395-396.
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watch which had made the arguments from the material universe
primary. But against those heady days of a foundational unity
between science and religion, Newman had learned a lesson from
ancient philosophy, "this remarkable fact in the history of heathen
Greece against the former supposition, that her most eminent
empirical philosophers were atheists, and that it was their atheism
which was the cause of their eminence. " 91 And in what did their
atheism consist, the atheism of Democritus and Epicurus? The
denial of providence, of final causes within the universe, of God or
mind dwelling within and directing the universe. Newman relied
upon Bacon's analysis for this tendency towards atheism among
mechanical philosophers or physicists: "Physical philosophers are
ever inquiring whence things are, not why; referring them to nature,
not to mind; and thus they tend to make a system a substitute for
a God. " 92 Contrary to the attempts to search science and physical
investigations for foundational assertion about the existence of
God, Newman counseled: "From religious investigations, as such,
physics must be excluded, and from physical, as such, religion;
and if we mix them, we shall spoil both. The theologian, speaking
of Divine Omnipotence, for the time simply ignores the laws of
nature as existing restraints upon its exercise; and the physical
philosopher, on the other hand, in his experiments upon natural
phenomena, is simply ascertaining those laws, putting aside the
question of that Omnipotence. " 93
The celebrated attempts of the seventeenth and eighteenth century to found religion on physics received from Newman what
must pass as one of his most sardonic comments: "There are religious experimentalists, though physics, taken by themselves, tend
91

Newman, "Secular Knowledge," in Discussions and Arguments on Various
Subjects, 298.
92
Ibid., 299.
93 Idea, 189.

CONSCIENCE AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ATHEISM

101

to infidelity; but to have recourse to physics to make men religious
is like recommending a canonry as a cure for the gout, or giving a
youngster a commission as a penance for irregularities. " 94 It is not
that all argument from the world of nature and from its order is
intrinsically false; it is that few are capable of such an argument
and fewer still to build religious belief upon it.
The results could be paradoxical: Make religion - as one does
in these physico-theologies - the conclusion of inference and you
will undermine it: "To most men argument makes the point in
hand only more doubtful, and considerably less impressive. After
all, man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal. He is influenced by what is direct and precise ... Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences. " 95
Science and literature may strengthen one's religious beliefs, but
the foundations for such convictions must be what is direct and
precise within human experience, and for human beings what is
most direct, what is most given in and by conscience. 96 Writing
from Rome in 1847, Newman summarized to J. D. Dalgairns his
very nuanced evaluation of the apologetics of the time: "(l) I hold
reason can prove the being of a God - that such a conclusion is
the legitimate result of reason well employed ... but this is very
94
Newman, "Secular Knowledge," in Discussions and Arguments on Various
Subjects, 299.
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different from saying that reason is the mode by which individuals
come at truth. (2) Next I have denied that the argument.from design
is philosophically true of course I retract it -

has the Holy See condemned this? if so,
but else I say the philosophical argument

of reason for the being of God is, not from external nature, but
from the law of conscience. " 97

If Europe, then, was to lose its sense of God, that loss must come
through a corruption of conscience. "Conscience may be deadened,"
Newman wrote to Baron Friedrich van Hugel. The accepted practices of the vendetta, for example, could as the customs of the
country leave one in "invincible

ignorance"

that cruelty was

98

wrong. As early as his study of the Arians of the Fourth Century,
Newman had maintained that "infidelity is a positive, not a negative state; it is a state of profaneness, pride, and selfishness; and
he who believes a little, but encompasses that little with the invention of men, is undeniably in a better condition than he who blots
out from his mind both the human inventions,

and that portion

of truth which was concealed in them." In this way, one could
understand how Origen was willing to deal in friendly interchange
with the pagan philosophers in Alexandria, but avoided deliberate
heretics and apostates. Ignorance of God is not simply ignorance,
an error of understanding or judgment. The loss of a sense of God
could only be moral. 99

Part Five: The Infallible Church
All of this could happen because the intellect alone was not
enough to secure the primacy of conscience and its mediation of
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the existence of God. After sin and within the fallen state of human
beings, nothing less than a divine intervention could steady human
beings in their recognition of a divine voice within the moral
imperative, or could bring them continually and resolutely before
that which was already present within them. So much countered
this mediation of God through conscience: the voice of conscience
was a demand for an austere subjection and obedience even in the
face of passionate self-interest, deception, the myriad conflicts
within motivation; the liberty claimed in some intellectual movements and championed by much in the culture was an antomony
or a spontaneity of human reason that in the absorptions of personal gratification, indulgence and self-complacency could become
illusion and rebellion. Before such massive counters, Newman was
pessimistic about the success of conscience to remain intact.
What could destroy conscience as the voice of God, as the primordial witness to God? The gradual erosion of religion through
the overextended claims of the autonomous reason, the reduction
of God and the things that pertain to God to the dimensions of
human understanding and expectations. At first nothing changes:
the external practices are maintained and the moral content of an
ethical code unaltered. But gradually and imperceptibly a sea
change in the understanding of conscience occurs. It is no longer
a response to the demands of another; it becomes a response to
what one demands of herself. As mentioned previously, conscience
in its religious usage can evoke fear as well as shame. Conscience
as cultivated moral sentiment can evoke only shame: "Fear carries
us out of ourselves, whereas shame may act upon us only within
the round of our own thoughts." The autonomous reason severs a
dependence upon God at this deepest level of human choice, leaving intact the moral life itself virtually unchanged initially. The
moral life is no longer an obedience to the command of God. Gradually, then, over time and with the increased exile of religion to
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formalities and the peripheries of life. It seems appropriate here to
cite a text already considered: "conscience tends to become what is
called the moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin
is not an offence against God, but against human nature." 100 Perhaps
one could say that infidelity, in Newman's sense of that word, can
begin when the superego subsumes the place of conscience.
For conscience does not cease to exist, but it becomes selfrespect. When one offends against it, shame is evoked by a sense
of being a fool rather than a sinner. The religious character of
conscience dies by a substitution, done so easily under the imperialism of the intellect, of an autonomous moral sense or taste,
responsible only to itself, for an obligation commanded and sanctioned by another. Moral life becomes only ethical, not religious;
conscience became, quite literally, godless. Edward Gibbon drew
the outlines of such an individual figure with his depiction in Julian,
of a "godless intellectualism" that was "an historical fulfillment of
his own idea of moral perfection." 101
As Europe moved towards its increasing distance from real convictions about the religious, about the divine and effective presence
or imperative within human life, various expedients had been
attempted "to arrest fierce willful human nature in its onward
course, and to bring it into subjection." But what could have the
"force and the toughness necessary to be a breakwater against the
deluge?" 102 The political establishment of national churches in
various countries in Europe was attempted, but this was giving way
before its own ineffectuality. 103
Education was another expedient, and in 1841 Sir Robert Peel
and Lord Brougham had launched a program which maintained
100
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"that the claims of religion could be secured and sustained in the
mass of men, and in particular in the lower classes of society, by
acquaintance with literature and physical science, and through the
instrumentality of Mechanics' Institutes and Reading Rooms."
Newman found this a dream and a delusion. It reduced religion to
conclusions and opinions, neither of which will sustain human conviction under the demands and allurements of life. Both strategies
substituted notional assent about propositions for the concrete realities to which religious and real assent is given: "The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination,
by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and
events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt
us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and
die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion." 104
Newman would extend the same judgment to Sacred Scripture
itself, even while insisting that its source is God and its reading grace.
It has proven historically idle to attempt to make of the bible an instrument for which it was never intended, i.e. a continual response to the
skeptical human intellect, infinite in the varieties of doubts that it
fosters and passionate in the urgency with which self-seeking can give
those doubts form and substance. "A book, after all, cannot make a
stand against the wild living intellect of man, and in this day it [Scripture] begins to testify, as regards its own structure and contents, to the
power of that universal solvent, which is so successfully acting upon
religious establishments." 105Philosophic and literary religion becomes
liberalism, the anti-dogmatic religious movement against which Newman spent his life; scriptural religion became evangelicalism, which
played directly into the hands of the liberals." 106 There had to be a
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divine intervention that was more than human inference and sentiment
on one side and a book on the other. In terms of this, Newman
understood the incarnation of the Son of God and the continuation
of his authoritative teaching in an infallible Church.
What did Newman mean by an infallible Church? "I would
rather word the question thus," he wrote, "'Can I be certain that
God is true and that God has spoken?' And I prefer to put it in this
shape, because I understand what is meant better, while I think it
is the real interpretation of any thing which I hold myself about the
Church's infallibility." 107
The present infidelity was a "moral epidemic, and it is likely to
have its course. While it lasts, argument is useless ... Personal experience of the power of the Gospel is our great, or our only defense
from scepticism. Argument is of little use. Beyond this inward evidence, an Infallible Church is the main external safeguard - But
when minds are wilful, there is no safeguard at all. 108
This conviction brought Newman to an understanding of the
moral need for an infallible Church, paradoxically one of the most
scandalous features of the Catholic Church for Victorian England.
The Church was the continuation of the presence of Christ, an
abiding reminder of the religious, of the involvement of God at the
deepest level of human life, an involvement that was both sustaining, transforming, and correcting the movement of the intellectual
and passionate appetites of human beings. For the Church - with
all of the distinctions and caveats upon which Newman could insist
and at great length - could speak on fundamental religious issues
in the name and by the authority of God.
For Newman, it was the charism of infallibility which gave the
Church its meaning, its manner of teaching and action, and its
107
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peculiar mission to the world. "Supposing then it to be the Will of
the Creator to interfere in human affairs, and to make provisions
for retaining in the world a knowledge of Himself, so definite and
distinct as to be proof against the energy of human scepticism ...
there is nothing to surprise the mind, if He should think fit to introduce a power into the world, invested with the prerogative of infallibility in religious matters. Such a provision would be a direct,
immediate, active, and prompt means of withstanding the difficulty; ... And thus I am brought to speak of the Church's infallibility, as a provision, adapted by the mercy of the Creator, to preserve
religion in the world, and to restrain that freedom of thought, which
of course in itself is one of the greatest of our natural gifts, and to
rescue it from its own suicidal excesses." 109
As a response to the religious self-destruction of human kind,
then, Newman articulates both a transcendental and categorical
witness to the reality of God. Transcendentally, there is the authoritative witness of conscience, innate and supreme in every human
being, pervasively present through every human choice, and
strengthened and perfected because interiorly transformed by the
grace of the indwelling Spirit. Categorically, there is the authoritative witness of the church, the extension or body of Christ, proclaiming with certitude the fundamental creed and morality of the
Christian community and the involvement of God within human
life - "the great elementary truths" - in such a way as legitimately to demand a response in absolute faith, a community sent
to and safeguarded in its definitive proclamation by divine mandate
and the Spirit of Christ.
Only such a power, contended Newman, could counter those
beginnings of-error, of religious skepticism and self-interest, and
gradual disengagement, whose organic and ultimate effect is to
109
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undermine all religious belief in any divine involvement within
human life. On the other hand, one could diminish the religious
nature of conscience by destroying any such authoritative ecclesial
voice by which it could be sustained and safeguarded. And this
diminishment of an authoritative church, the substitution of religious sentiment for dogma, had marked European scepticism. The
rise of complete disbelief, the rise of atheism, was but the organic
development of such a dirninishment.
For just as there is an organic development of doctrine, so there
is an organic devolution of belief. The Grammar of Assent traced
out one such movement as example: "The third [person] gradually subsided into infidelity, because he started with the Protestant
dogma, cherished in the depth of his nature, that a priesthood was
a corruption of the simplicity of the Gospel. First, then, he would
protest against the sacrifice of the Mass; next he gave up baptismal
regeneration, and the sacramental principle; then he asked himself
whether dogmas were not a restraint on Christian liberty as well as
sacraments; then came the question, what after all was the use of
teachers of religion? Why should any one stand between him and
his Maker? After a time it struck him, that this obvious question
had to be answered by the Apostles, as well as by the Anglican
clergy; so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revelation of God to man is that which is written on the heart. This did
for a time, and he remained a Deist. But then it occurred to him,
that this inward moral law was there within the breast, whether
there was a God or not, and that it was a round about way of
enforcing that law, to say that it came from God, and simply unnecessary, considering that it carried with it its own sacred and sovereign authority, as our feelings instinctively testified; and when he
turned to look at the physical world around him, he really did not
see what scientific proof there was there of the Being of God at all,
and it seemed to him as if all things would go on quite as well as
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at present, without that hypothesis as with it; so he dropped it, and
became a purus, putus Atheist." 110
The only external power that can inhibit the beginnings of such
decline, one that could insist upon the intimate and demanding
intervention of God within human life, is an historical church
which can definitively and continually over the centuries formulate
or proclaim the Christian creed and authoritatively decide if a new
articulation of the faith of this community is its faithful translation into another idiom. Only a community under such a mandate
to preach and to summon to belief and assured of an indwelling
divine assistance could morally ask for faith in its most fundamental
doctrine.
This is not the place to explore the relationship in Newman
between ecclesiology and belief, but only to note that they are
inextricably united. Both conscience and the church, in variously
different ways and modalities, speak authoritatively to the Christian awareness and in so doing mediate - again in vastly different
ways and modalities - the reality of God. Dismiss either of them,
maintained Newman, and there is no logical pausing in religious
disintegration until one reaches total disbelief in the existence of
God. This was the pattern that Newman saw in the atheism emerging in his own time and reaching a pervasive presence in the century which was opening before him.
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